West Pointers and the Civil War
The Old Army in War and Peace
By Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh
(UNC Press, 304 pp., ISBN 978-0-8078-3278-3)
Americans at one time were very sensitive to standing armies and very distrustful of the idea of a large professional fighting force, which is why throughout the 19th and early 20th Centuries America time and again was woefully unprepared for war. At the outbreak of the Civil War the United States had a meager 16,000 soldiers. There was a constant tradition of militia units in many parts of America. These local organization were based on proud tradition and myth. Whether it was the American Revolution or the War of 1812, and in particular the Battle of New Orleans (1815). We know that “citizen soldiers,” though they had their moments, were notoriously ineffective when engaged in nation state warfare. However, in early colonial America, they were very effective protecting their communities, but when asked to step away from home they were not very effective. Once again, they had their role and purpose, but they lacked the discipline and training modern warfare demanded.
To avoid chaos on the battlefield troops must have some discipline and organization. Wayne Wei-Sian Hsieh’s West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace emphasizes that the success and failure of Union Armies during the American Civil War had more to do with the quality (or lack thereof) of professional soldiers and leadership. It was not so much field fortifications or new technology, but leadership, training and the resulting morale of the foot soldiers.
I got the opportunity to get into this book sooner than expected and am very happy to have been able to do so. On pages 186-187 Hsieh gets to what I feel is the heart of his thesis when he writes: “Although the presence of fieldworks did expotentially increase the power of the tactical defensive durng the Overland campaign, the Army of the Potomac had the numbers and material support necessary to overcome that defensive advantage, if properly commanded and led.”
As we already know, and as Hsieh points out, “only a small minority of corps commanders in the Army of the Potomac attained their posts through meritorious service on the battlefield.”
It would be the lack of professionally trained leadership that would hamper, time and again, the outcome of well planned and organized strategy. The absence of a solid corps commanders and leadership down to the Regimental level, costs the Union army countless times. Were their exceptions to this rule? Of course, lots. But by and large, leadership, according to Hsieh, and the lack there of was an important factor in the outcome of numerous battles.
I thoroughly have enjoyed reading this book, and though by no means an expert on this genre, I can confidently say that I would love to put Mr. Hsieh and Earl J. Hess on a stage and have them discuss their recent research as I think combined they have established a very unique way of approaching Civil War battles.
