Did the Cavalry Play a Decisive Role in the Civil War?

[This was a paper I wrote several years ago during my first year in Graduate School. I'm posting it as I thought it was decent, though surely flawed. Any comments appreciated!]

By the outbreak of the Civil War the importance of cavalry as a “decisive” element of modern warfare was debated both in Europe and the United States. With the development of rifled artillery and better small arms, most predicted that future cavalry units would become “mounted infantry,” or perhaps even marginalized to a kind of “special reserve” for cleaning up routed enemy infantry. So unconcerned was the North with the development of the cavalry that it refused voluntary units until after the devastating defeat at Bull Run. Clearly the South took to the development of its cavalry units far more seriously, as displayed by the success of J.E.B. Stuart and later on Nathan Bedford Forrest, and therefore gained a noted advantage during the first two or three years. Yet this did not lead to their success in the ultimate outcome of the war.

In the 18th Century brilliant tacticians such as Gustavus Adolphus and Marlborough used cavalry as an offensive weapon equal to that of heavy and light infantry. The cavalry would be arranged into large and concentrated formations “capable of launching immense charges to break or overwhelm an enemy” at the pivotal moment. However, as time went on developments in technology and tactics continued to lessen the role of cavalry in some of the great European battles. Frederick the Great’s tactics, though making use of cavalry, favored the infantry to such a degree that cavalry was “reduced to a supporting arm,” and no longer was the key offensive weapon that it once was. So much so was the reduction in the importance of cavalry units that during the Napoleonic wars most armies had “comparatively” few cavalry to that of Napoleon. And clearly Napoleon’s use of massed cavalry charges no doubt peeked the imagination of Southern and Northern American horseman alike. However, his cavalry would ultimately fail him at Waterloo and hence fan the fire of debate as to its usefulness as a main offensive weapon. By the dawn of 1860 the role of cavalry in modern warfare was anything but conclusive.

Dating back to Hannibal’s victory at Cannae (216 B.C.) the turning or flanking movement, such as the one Hannibal used, became the desired objective of most military commanders. The use of cavalry was for a long time essential for such a movement. But as infantry developed new weapons and tactics, the use of cavalry as a shock element faded so much so that during the Civil War both Federal and Confederate military commanders dismissed the idea of using cavalry as a decisive battlefield tactical option. J.E.B. Stuart’s timely appearance at Bull Run aside, there are very few instances of cavalry, acting as a cavalry shock unit, and therefore playing any kind of decisive role in battle. In the war’s last significant conflict, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Lee’s ultimate demise can be credited with the ability of Federal cavalry units to sprint to a location, dismount and act as infantry. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to show how cavalry as a tactical element in battle failed to play a decisive role in outcome of the Civil War.

First we must understand that in order for us to recognize a true “cavalry” tactic it must act as such, fighting on their horses in some tactical manner or otherwise the horse becomes simply a vehicle for transportation. At best then, these units should be described as “mobile” infantry with the key element being their infantry fighting tactics as opposed to traditional cavalry tactics. In the traditional sense, cavalry were shock units that either rolled up enemy infantry from the flanks, out-dueled oppositional cavalry and then dispersed enemy infantry, or slammed into unprotected infantry causing mass panic, retreat, and usually a rout. In all such tactical events, the key element was speed and the use of the mounted cavalrymen wielding his saber was crucial. In the American Civil War, we simply do not see such events taking place in most major battles.

Usually the only time cavalry units, on either side, played any kind of significant role in the outcome of a major battle were when they failed in their role as the “eyes and ears” of the army, not as attacking or flanking elements, but instead as reconnaissance and information gathering devices. Lee bemoaned the absence of Stuart at Gettysburg just as Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant would of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan at North Anna River.

During the action at Pea Ridge, one of the first significant battles of the war, the cavalry was a fairly important element in the battle, though its use was uneven and its involvement did not play a significant role in the outcome as Confederate cavalry clearly outfought its counterpart, yet lost the battle.

One Federal colonel reported the nature of the fighting that day: “They [cavalry] skirmished constantly, and frequently dismounted to fight on foot. Some of the men whose horses were disabled joined the infantry and fought out the battles with them.” The 3rd Iowa Cavalry, also fighting it out at Pea Ridge, supporting infantry and artillery was still mounted when it advanced down a wooded road only to be ambushed and receive a “deadly” fire from a “partly concealed” infantry force that resulted in a “large number” of casualties and their retreat, leaving both man and beast littered across the field. Sometime later, the First Missouri Cavalry was able to outduel the 3rd Iowa Cavalry and even take the guns and destroy them.

One of the largest and most lively cavalry attacks of the entire Civil War occurred during the Battle of Pea Ridge. In a large prairie along Ford Road near Fosters Farm and Sturdy Farm some 3,000 Confederate cavalry charged in mass across a wide field and smashed into Federal cavalry guarding artillery. Here we see a successful shock tactic use to perfection. According to witnesses, the Rebel cavalry swarmed down upon them (the attacked took place on a downward slope) with the most hideous shrieks and hollers and in hand to hand combat forced the Federal’s to flee the field. However, though the events on that day caused some who witnessed them to hearken back to Napoleon’s heady cavalry charges, historians have noted that the charge near Foster’s Farm was “one of the last Napoleonic cavalry charges on American soil.” The elements required for such an event to take place again: large numbers of massed cavalry, wide open and unbroken fields, and the absence of enfiladed artillery, would rarely materialize.

A perfect example of the failure of cavalry shock tactics against infantry and the negating effect of terrain can be seen early on in the Civil War at the Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing. Towards the end of a long day of fighting, after being nearly rolled up to the docks of the Tennessee River by Confederate infantry, the colonel of the 77th Pennsylvania Infantry was ordered by Lieut. Gen. William T. Sherman to protect what was left of Sherman’s left flank. They moved out over an open terrain where they received “heavy” fire from artillery and infantry. While in place, still in the open field, they were suddenly attacked by a (unconfirmed size) group of Tennessee cavalry. Twice the Tennesseans charged, but both times “repulsed with heavy loss.” The Confederates were routed and their colonel captured.

Consistently when cavalry charged infantry the results were not good. In October of 1862 a Confederate cavalry brigade attacked the rear guard of Brig. Gen. A.A. Humphrey’s division only to be turned back after the infantry opened fire and emptied “many saddles.” Near Hills Plantation in Arkansas, a column of 350 Federal Infantry would hold off and ultimately (with the help of a small Indiana cavalry regiment) defeat a large group (2,000) of Texas Rangers. Another prime example of the superiority of infantry fire and tactics against mounted cavalry took place in 1862 in Arkansas. Col. Charles L. Harris of the 11th Wisconsin and his column were a part of Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis’s Army of Southwest as it desperately tried to reach Helena, Ark., and fresh supplies. While on reconnaissance, Harris ran into the Texas Rangers in what was described as an ambush only it would be the Texans who were mauled and fled the battlefield. After taking an initial volley from the Rangers Harris ordered his men to return fire. The opening volley by the Confederates was for the most part harmless as most of them were armed with poor weapons such as shotguns and squirrel hunting rifles. Sensing the need to attack, the Texans charged the tiny ban, numerous times, but to their amazement they were “repulsed at the point of the bayonet” recorded army surgeon who was present during the battle. Several times during the fight the Rangers attempted to blast into the infantry, and every time they met with consistent and accurate fire that unseated many. Those that reached the line were greeted with bayonets. When the battle was over and the Texans fled the field, over 150 of their dead littered the battlefield.

When cavalry units squared off against each other, it was the dismounted units that consistently repulsed mounted cavalry attacks. Col. Edward Hatch of the 2nd Iowa Cavalry ordered his men to dismount and lie “flat upon the ground” as Confederate cavalry charged their position trying to overtake Federal artillery. After an effective volley the charge was repulsed. Still, the Confederate cavalry charged again, and for a second time, the charge was turned back by a direct and accurate fire.

Also, surprisingly, when attempting to out-flank the enemy, cavalry often dismounted to do so. Col. Cyrus L. Dunham of the 50th Indiana Infantry was in a tough spot. His brigade was bloodied, their ammunition was low, and they were exhausted from continuous fighting. While Dunham organized his defense (as it attempted to protect Federal artillery), they were “suddenly and furiously attacked… by a heavy dismounted [cavalry] force which had, under the cover of the hills and woods beyond, turned our right flank.” Thinking fast he ordered a bayonet charge that held off the dismounted cavalry force. At this same moment, another group of Confederates came at them from another direction, this time a smaller but mounted contingent, which was also repulsed after a severe volley by Dunham’s men.
In 1864 Brig. Gen. George A. Custer and his combined force of cavalry and infantry were engaged in a wild affair near Stony Mountain, Virginia. Somewhere near the Fredericksburg Plank Road in an open field his pickets were driven in by a “large group” of enemy cavalry. Custer’s force was in good position with some of his men dismounted and hidden in the woods. They were able to repulse the enemy several times. However, during these assaults the Confederates sent dismounted cavalry around on Custer’s right in a flanking movement; once again, not relying on mounted cavalry but dismounted cavalry acting as infantry. This movement was detected and Custer sent a regiment of Michigan cavalry to stop the movement. However, this was not enough to check the advance. Custer then added artillery and dismounted cavalry and combined they were able to hold their right and eventually drive the enemy from the field.

The official records are filled with countless descriptions of small to medium sized cavalry charges that failed. However, without time for a scientific study, the results can only be described as mostly unsuccessful and some resulting in destructive results. No doubt there are some examples of successful cavalry charges and I have noted that, yet the evidence seems to clearly support show that when cavalry played key roles in battle, it was mainly acting as infantry.

This is not to say that the cavalry could not be effective. The Confederacy developed several different methods for using mounted cavalry in what historian Robert R. Mackey called “irregular warfare” tactics. Throughout the upper South guerrilla, partisan and raiding warfare for a time caused the North great trouble. John S. Mosby’s 43rd Virginia Cavalry Battalion reaped havoc in parts of northern Virginia. Not to be outdone, others such as John H. Morgan in Tennessee and Kentucky, William Quantrill in the Trans-Mississippi, and Jeff Thompson in Arkansas also produce successful results. For a time these guerrilla units threatened the stability of the Federal army, but, as Mackey notes, by 1865 they had failed due to superior Northern strategy which is why Robert E. Lee did not order his men to take to the hills as guerrilla fighters, they had already tried and failed.

By 1864 cavalry shock tactics in the Western Theater began to find some success and so much so that Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans ordered 3,000 sabers for his mounted cavalry. The shock tactic might have had a few marginal successes, maybe even a resurgence of sorts, but as one historian noted, the evidence is “fragmentary” at best. Federal cavalry was clearly outperformed by its Southern counterpart. In the Western Theater we first see real Federal success, yet in the realm of overall operations, the Confederate cavalry dominated until 1864. With the Shenandoah Expedition by Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan came the arrival of truly devastating cavalry tactics. As a psychological weapon, the arrival of Federal cavalry among the citizenry of the South was greeted with terror. During Sheridan’s campaign saber charges were employed and proved effective, continuing on to September and the Battle of Winchester, where more success for shock tactics using the saber and quick strikes. Yet, what we see developing during the Shenandoah Expedition is the evolution of cavalry tactics using both mounted and dismounted, and doing so to perfection. Evidence of cavalry success never seemed to rid itself of its dismounted nature during the Civil War.

Finally, it would be deceptive to leave the impression that both Federal and Confederate commanders did not want to use grand charges in the style of Napoleon, they simply discovered early on that they often could not even consider such a tactic due to the broken landscape of most American Civil War battlefields. The large open and sweeping fields that allowed hundreds of thousands of Europeans to wage war did not and could not have happened on American soil in the 1860s.

In conclusion, the nature of the landscape, the failure of cavalry shock tactics when matched against the infantry, and the increased use of cavalry as secondary or reconnaissance and raiding parties – though very affective at times – never became important enough to play a “decisive” role in the outcome of the American Civil War.

[footnotes removed]