Blog 4 History

Colonel Charles E. Hovey of the 33rd Illinois was appointed a Brigadier General of Volunteers on September 5, 1862 after having seen little action. However, the U.S. Senate did not to act on his nomination within the statuary period and it expired by law on March 4, 1863. In the interim, Hovey did play a key role in the capture of Arkansas Post in January 1863, where William T. Sherman reported that Hovey had been “wounded in his arm by a shell, but continued and still continues to command his Brigade.” Suffering lingering effects from his injury, Hovey soon left the field service. With the close of the war, he was given a brevet promotion to major general “for gallant and meritorious conduct in battle, particularly at Arkansas Post, January 11, 1863.”

However, what has been missed or ignored by historians is the true reasons for his promotion, and why Congress justifiably refused to approve it.

On August 2, 1862 a skirmish took place on a plantation in Mississippi, 10 miles from the river. It turned into a fairly lively affair requiring Hovey to file a short report in which he wrote: “Hearing that a regiment of cavalry was at or back of this point, about 10 miles below my camp, I came down with a force of infantry and cavalry…”

According to a soldier who was a member of that party, their purpose was solely for cotton confiscating. The day before, their party came across a plantation where they discovered “300 bails of cotton,” but they where only able to carry off “100 bales.” This would require that they return the next day, August 2nd. Hovey’s trip on the 2nd hand nothing to do with Confederate cavalry, but cotton.

On the 2nd they arrived at the plantation and the Negroes helped load it into wagons. “Col. Hovey gave him [the owner] a claim on U.S. for the cotton, to be paid after the war closes…” They got the cotton back to the river and then heard about another plantation. Hovey decided to check it out. “We immediately went to the plantation,” wrote this soldier and at which point they encountered 80 rebels who were trying to destroy the cotton. A fight broke out, one that cost the 11th Wisconsin 3 wounded.

Hovey then took his cotton and returned to camp where he create a false report about enemy cavalry as a justification for his actions that cost several soldiers serious wounds. On other such trips soldiers would not be so lucky, they would lose their lives for Hovey and his cotton gathering.

So the question still begs, What did Curtis know and was he facilitating this “Cotton Brigade” in order to profit from it or was he aloof to it?

[Since I am not pretty much convinced that high ranking officers in the Army of the Southwest were involved in cotton speculation, I will not be revealing my sources as I am going to write a scholarly article on these findings. I will offer what I have found.]

Parts of the Army of the Southwest were kept in eastern Arkansas for three months camped along the Mississippi River. From there one brigade in particular made almost DAILY expeditions for the sole purpose of cotton confiscation and speculation. From letters, diaries and regimental history books I find that one brigade in particular was very active in cotton collecting. That for three months they were kept in one region to do just that. This seems to collaborate John S. Phelps belief that Curtis purposely kept his army idle for the sole purpose of cotton grabbing. The following is from a regimental history from this “Cotton Brigade:”

As to the service of the [regiment] for the next three months, I hesitate to speak. During that time there was scarcely a day when a detachment of the regiment was not sent on expeditions, on one side of the river or on the other; sometimes at a distance of a hundred miles of more… to collect baled cotton and load it on steamboats, and in nearly every one of these forays a scrimmage was had at some cotton gin or pile of cotton bakes, the regiment losing from time to time a number killed and wounded to say nothing of being continually shot at while passing up and down the rive in boats.

[after being ordered to move there camp to a very in-hospital place, he writes] …There was no reason that we should be sent to that deadly place, expect that we would be somewhat nearer the cotton area.

…How much of this ‘cotton collecting’ was done for the government and how much for private interest, I do not know…

This falls right in line with accusations by Phelps. I have some other documents to share and shall within the week.

John S. Phelps (pictured left) was a lawyer and a Democrat Missouri congressman. At the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, he enlisted as a private in the Missouri Infantry. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on October 2, 1861 and to colonel December 19, 1861. By special ar­rangement with President Lincoln, Phelps organized an infantry regiment which bore his name, Phelps’s Regiment, Missouri Volunteer Infantry. The regiment spent most of the winter of 1861—62 as the garrison of Fort Wyman at Rolla. In March 1862, Phelps led his regiment in the fierce fighting at Pea Ridge in Arkansas. He was mustered out May 13, 1862. In July 1862, he was appointed by President Lincoln as Military Governor of Arkansas.

During 1862 he was very outspoken over the alleged cotton speculation by Federal soldiers and officers in Arkansas. On two separate occasions he wrote to Gen. Halleck and Secretary of War, Stanton, complaining about cotton speculation and specifically, Maj. Gen Samuel R. Curtis (pictured bottom right).

That Federal officers, especially Colonels such as Charles E. Hovey (33rd Illinois) were profiting from cotton speculation is not a surprise. That generals would also do it, is not. However, Phelps implications of Curtis are, as very, very few biographies of him mention anything concerning his possible involvement in cotton profiteering. It may not seem like a big deal, but regular soldiers died and these officers became rich as a result.

Over the coming weeks I will look into the cotton speculation in Arkansas along the Mississippi and will offer my final report before writing what I hope will be an interesting article.

On September 28, 1862 Phelps wrote to Halleck concerning some rumors:

From Saint Louis, under date of August 17, I wrote you, stating the rumors in relation to the seizure of cotton and the speculations in that article, in which it was said officers of high rank were engaged. Such rumors are current here in relation to the conduct of some of the officers, and the late commander of this Army of the Southwest is not exempt from such charges. I have not investigated these rumors. The army was much demoralized in its march from Batesville to this point and whilst lying here. In my letter I suggested the course I deemed expedient in relation to cotton, and time has satisfied me I was right in those suggestions. Much property has been taken from the citizens in this vicinity and but little of it has been accounted for to the Government.

He is of course referring to Curtis’s Army of the Southwest. As you will see, Phelps is suggesting that Curtis kept his army near cotton rich areas for the sole purpose of cotton speculation. Entire brigades would be sent out on cotton stealing and confiscating missions that would cost the lives of many soldiers. The cotton speculating trickled down all the way to colonels and surgeons.

Stay tuned…

I wanted to add to a great post on what sounds like a great book over at Drew’s Books and Authors site. THe book he discusses is From Conciliation to Conquest: The Sack of Athens and the Court-Martial of Colonel John B. Turchin, by George C. Bradley and Richard L. Dahlen. It sounds like a book I would be very interested in as it deals with those aspects of political and social thought during the war that interest me. For example,

The authors ask important questions. Was it even possible for volunteers, egged on from all sides by the harsh rhetoric of revenge espoused by newspapers, elected officials, and their own communities, to suppress these urges and carry out a viable policy of conciliation?

I recently just finished reading a collection of letters published from the University of Wisconsin in 1960 titled “Well Mary: Civil War Letters of a Wisconsin Volunteer.” The letters are written by private John F. Brobst of the 25th Wisconsin Regiment, and saw action along the Mississippi and Sherman’s Atlanta campaign.

John joined the army in 1863, a very volatile time with the draft, the emancipation proclamation, and the change in Federal military policy away from conciliation and towards a more “hard war” approach. His letters really reflect this theme as he writes of his interaction with Confederate prisoners and soldiers in battle. He writes of incidents where Confederate prisoners are murdered trying to surrender and numerous times makes it clear that the South deserves all the wrath the North can muster, he writes:

There was one of the Iowa regiments charged on a rifle pit, and twenty-three of the rebs surrendered but the boys asked them if they remembered Fort Pillow and killed all of them. When there was no officer with us, we take no prisoners. We want revenge and we are bound to have it one way or the other.

John goes on to tell about a prisoner he took, “I shot him through the leg before I took him,” he tells his sweetheart in his letter. As the war progresses from 1863 to 1864 while with Sherman near Atlanta he writes,

…they [South] must come to our terms or have no peace… We want to kill them all off and cleanse the country…

There is no doubt in my mind that a lot of Federal soldiers at this time were very jaded in their opinion of the South. We cannot let the chivalry of Sherman and Grant be assumed to have been the norm for all Northern soldiers. I would like to think that by wars end, all had a mutual respect and a mutual desire to end the conflict and that such feelings of hatred subsided quickly.

Anyway, “Well Mary” was a very interesting read and one that supports much of what it sounds like Bradley and Dahlen discuss in their book. I hope to get a copy of it from the publisher soon.

It was not my intention, but the site has had an overhaul. Last night I was simply trying to update the software and ended up accidentally deleting my original theme that I had designed and had to find a new one. This one will work for now.

Well, next week I start my journey as a first year social studies teacher at a public school in Colorado. I have been working off and on all summer on possible lesson plans and what not, but now that the clock is ticking down it is becoming a bit stressful. I have worked as a youth advocate, probation officer, and website designer. Now I start my teaching career. This may from time to time interfere with my blog posting but I do not suspect it will stop it. So if there are times when I have a week here or there with no new posts please excuse.

C

Test your knowledge about William Tecumseh Sherman on The History Net! I got 2 wrong…

Take the QUIZ HERE!

The Civil War in Tennessee, 1862-1863, by Jack H. Lepa

McFarland
ISBN 978-0-7864-2978-3
photos, notes, bibliography, index
239pp. hardcover (7 x 10) 2007
$45

You type in “Civil War Virginia” in google.com and you get a return of 35,800, however, change the Virginia to “Tennessee” and you get less than a thousand. The Eastern Theater has always received the most attention. It saw lots of battles. Virginia alone saw 128, the most by far of any state. (Tennessee is second with 38). The largest armies fought in some of the most desperate battles in the east. But does that alone make it the most important region of the conflict and the place where the war was decided? No, clearly not. Though the Western Theater does not get the attention it deserves, it clearly was the most important region and its demise had the largest single impact on the war. With that in mind, Tennessee is at the heart of that region, and the fighting that took place there saved the Union.

All one has to do is look at a map. If you visualize the United States at that time as a body, Tennessee is the heart. The most important rivers and railroads, for not just transportation but future recruits, fall within Tennessee at some point. The Tennessee/Georgia Railroad, Memphis/Charleston Railroad, Nashville/Chattanooga Railroad, and lets not forget about the rivers: Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland; all provided vital lifeblood (the main blood vessel) for the Confederacy.

Jack H. Lepa’s book is an excellent study detailing the key battles and events in the struggle for control of Tennessee during 1862 and 1863, one that the Federal army would ultimately win, but not because the South or North was better at understanding the value of the region. Controlling the rivers, railroads and mountain trails was key for the Union as it changed its strategy by 1864. The Federal army got lucky in that it simply had the better generals, and the better equipped and trained army in Tennessee.

The book was well written and seemed in-depth enough, though at 232 pages including the index it felt a little light sometimes and could have used more detail. Lepa does draw from contemporary sources such as memoirs and official correspondence. Maps were few and far between and not of quality.

Jack H. Lepa is also the author of “Breaking the Confederacy” (2005) and “The Shenandoah Valley Campaign in 1864″ (2003).

Hey, please consider voting for Soldier Studies. (Not sure what SoldierStudies.org is VISIT HERE.) Yes, I am the co-creator and this is a shameless plug. But I also feel it is a great resource and worth being listed as a top Civil War site.

To vote: VOTE HERE

Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862, by O. Edward Cunningham and edited by Gary D. Joiner and Timothy B. Smith

Savas Beatie, 2007
Hardback, 32 maps, photos, notes, appendices, bibliography, photographic battlefield tour.
Pp. 520
$34.95
ISBN: 1-932714-27-8

I presented a post here about the Battle of Shiloh as I was in the midst of reading O. Edward Cunningham’s “Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862,” which is the best book on Shiloh I’ve ever read. As the book’s editors point out, with only really three modern books written about the battle, [Wiley Sword "Shiloh: Bloody April" (1974, Revised 2001); James McDonough "Shiloh: In Hell Before Night" (1977); Larry Daniel "Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War" (1997)], it seemed appropriate to bring this already fairly well-known manuscript to print.

It’s strange to me that Shiloh gets such little recognition compared to the other severe contests of the war. Its outcome was significant for the campaign in Tennessee and had it turned out differently (if it had been a defeat for Grant) it could have had serious consequences on the war. On top of that, the reasons for its outcome are still to this day not agreed on by historians.

Edward Cunningham, a young Ph.D. candidate studying under the legendary T. Harry Williams at Louisiana State University, researched and wrote “Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 186″ in 1966. Now 41 years later it is finally in a format so everyone can enjoy it. Unfortunately, Dr. Cunningham did not get to see it as he died in 1997 – congratulations to Savas Beatie for doing so.

The book was edited by Gary D. Joiner, Ph.D., who is the author of several books, and Timothy B. Smith, Ph.D., and the author of “Champion Hill: Decisive Battle for Vicksburg” (winner of the 2004 Mississippi Institute of Arts and Letters Non-fiction Award). Both men do a fantastic job adding some additional depth and modern sources to notes. They also did remove and edit some of Cunningham’s original writing, which I am still not sure how I feel about that.

Cunningham’s narrative style is one of the things that surprised me. His writing carriers you in and out of the technical aspects of the battle effortlessly with a wonderful prose that includes tidbits of interesting details on the regimental and even the individual soldier levels.

This book is easily in the top 5 of Western Theater studies of the Civil War.

As the editors note, Cunningham’s work was ground breaking (and ahead of its time) in several ways. There are several different takes on the “keys” to the battle’s outcome. One school of thought suggests it was the staunch resistance by Prentiss and his men at the Hornet’s Nest and Sunken Road that saved the day for the Federals. Another school of thought says that the death of Confederate General A. S. Johnston determined the battle’s outcome. The third and final main school of thought points out the disarray and disorganization of attack and the lack of understand of the Federal’s positions as the most significant factor in the fighting’s outcome. In essence, Johnston had devised a faulty battle plan.

Cunningham’s work falls in with this last school of thought; only he did so forty years ago. He also is the first to suggest that the Sunken Road really wasn’t sunken and that it did not play a role in the battle. Even recent scholarship (Sword, 1974/2001) suggests that Johnston’s death was the key.

Though I am no expert and have spent minimal time looking at battle reports, soldier correspondences, and maps, I tend to agree with Cunningham that the planning of the attack probably played the largest role in the battle’s outcome. And I also agree with Cunningham that the inexperience of the Confederate soldiers also played a significant role. For the most part they were facing a well-trained, well-armed, and experienced Federal army.

But, allow me to play armchair General, oh goodie! Johnston’s phalanx battle plan (which I pointed out here) was probably where the problems started and was the main reason for the confusion among his fighting units. However, it could still have been used had he created an anvil and hammer strategy like we have seen, though not successfully, at Stone’s River and other places. See map below for original Confederate battle plan:

Instead of trying to push Grant away from Pittsburg Landing, Johnston should have made it the anvil, and came crashing down on it hitting Grant’s right (Sherman’s Division). Now what could have been lucky for Jonhston, is that Sherman’s division was almost entirely green. Few had seen combat and some regiments were only weeks into their service. Sherman was also short a brigade that was placed over near the landing. When the fighting started regiments melted away and fled. Sherman’s division was reduced to nothing in a matter of hours against one division from the Confederates.Additionally, the landing would not have provided much of an escape. It would have taken hours and hours for Grant to evacuate in case of a disaster. Had Johnston been able to achieve the crushing blow he wanted, he would have indeed forced Grant’s capitulation.

Grant’s best route for escape would have been the Hamburg-Savannah River Road, which lead to Crump’s Landing. By hitting Sherman’s position hard with Hardee and Polk’s divisions, Johnston would have collapsed the inexperienced and nervous brigade, thrown it back into McClernand’s division, which would have been catastrophic. Then the Confederates could wheel and turn the flank and force the Federals back up against the river with no real escape. See map below (with my adjustments):

While Hardee and Polk collapsed Sherman, Bragg and Breckenridge would essentially follow the same route and push Prentiss and Wallace back towards the landing where Grant’s entire army would be compressed without an escape route. The mass of humanity collapsing onto the landing would have made any defense and escape impossible.The hammer would have crushed Grant’s army upon the anvil (the Tennessee River).

Whew, that was fun. Anyone care to interject and correct me or make suggestions?

McClellan and Failure: A Study of Civil War Fear, Incompetence and Worse
Edward H. Bonekemper, III

ISBN 978-0-7864-2894-6
photos, maps, appendix, notes, bibliography, index
222pp. hardcover (7 x 10) 2007
McFarland

Edward H. Bonekemper’s scathing depiction of the contemptuous Civil War record of George B. McClellan is a wonderfully flawed piece of historical narration.

What I mean by flawed is that Bonekemper did not set out to write a fair or balanced account of McClellan’s performance, but instead had an agenda that he openly confesses to: “I believe McClellan as the worst Union Civil War general and provide readers with information to justify that position in these pages,” he proclaims in the first page of his “Introduction.”

Bonekemper then systematically exposes event after event in a ruthless and divisive tone that I absolutely loved. As I, for one, completely agree with his purpose and his presentation. Which is exactly why a historian such as Bonekemper, and others, should not be evaluating McClellan. At least not without something to balance their work.

There was no attempt at a balanced presentation that sought to understand the flawed mind of George B. McClellan. A man, who clearly was not just acting from arrogance and selfishness, but was also with severe psychological issues that I will not attempt to diagnose. In his own world, the enemy was always more superior to a point where it was debilitating for him to even act or be in a position to act once the fighting started. To completely understand McClellan and his motivations, which was another aspect of Bonekemper’s scholarship, you have to recognize and appreciate that for McClellan to act at all, was extremely difficult. So when he did act, though painfully slowly, such as at Antietam when he knew he had the upper-hand, it was remarkable that he did with any vigor at all. Though he had Lee’s battle plan in his hands, he still was confounded with an inferiority complex that to even attempt a decisive blow was unfathomable. McClellan created a fictional world within his own mind that justified and supported his pathological behavior. It oozes from all of his letters written to his wife. She even at one point calls him on it. All this, Bonekemper does not give much credence or attempt to investigate with any open mindedness.

But what a read this was. Oh how I loved it. If there was a shred of doubt as to who the most incompetent human being on the face of earth in 1861-62, this book would sell you to it being George B. McClellan. But yet I could not help but wonder about the many apparent facets of McClellan’s behavior. Was he just incompetent or was he subconsciously trying to sabotage the North’s war effort because of his sympathy for the South? Look at all the people he undermined and destroyed… it’s not hard to imagine.

It is hard to imagine any historian (apologist) defending McClellan much. What I seek is not protection, but understanding. What I learned in this book I already knew. If there was a more conflicted and complex mind during the Civil War than George B. McClellan, I would like to know who it was?

This book also brought other questions to my mind and some had little to do with McClellan. Where’s the criticism of Lincoln? My God, how long do you have to put up with someone before you act? Also, Robert E. Lee, his Seven Days’ Battle against McClellan kind of set him up on a pedestal for the rest of the war. Though it was a campaign that in all likelihood would have failed, utterly, and resulted in his defeat and the capture of Richmond had there been a competent Union commander in charge.

Does the fact that Lee benefits for 2 years from such incompetence on the part of Union generalship degrade his success? (I’m sure it has been argued.)

Bonekemper also includes an Appendix covering what historians have written about McClellan. I am not an expert, but appears that he covers it well and does a fine job establishing his overall argument, albeit not hard to do, and proves his thesis. McClellan was incompetent, self-indulgent, self-centered, and afraid to fail. But did this book give us any true insight into the workings of McClellan’s mind? No. Was that its intention? No, but to be a unique book on what is a popular topic, that might have been a better aim.

———–
I have two more books from McFarland that I am reading:

The 149th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Unit in the Civil War, by Richard E. Matthews that is so far a good solid read concerning a regiment that saw severe service in the Eastern Theater.

The Civil War in Tennessee, 1862–1863, by Jack H. Lepa which is also going well and will probably end up making my top 20 books, Western Theater of the Civil War.